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The spread of the HIV and AIDS pan-
demic in the African context today calls 
for a critical refl ection on the virtue of 
justice. I begin by describing in a broad 
manner recent perspectives on justice. I 
then examine the meaning of justice in 
the context of HIV AIDS, with a limited 
focus on religious healthcare, especially 
the Christian tradition that is a major 
partner in healthcare delivery in Africa. 
Justice for many is a national and glob-
al concern even though philosophers 
and theologians often examine justice 
within the confi nes of the nation state. 
Justice is a global issue because inter-
national protocols like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and re-
cent articulations of women’s rights call 
for a rethinking of justice. The growing 
abuse of human rights today and the 
inability of many states to meet the ba-
sic needs of their citizens, especially in 
relation to food, water, and health point 
to the absence of justice.1 Charles Beitz 
argues that justice is a compelling idea 
for a cosmopolitan context because of 
growing economic interdependence 
and transnational politics.2 
At the national level, the scope of 
justice includes individual and social 
units. It is a virtue grounded on the 
traits that people possess and exert; 
a view which John Rawls described as 
“the fi rst virtue of social institutions”.3 I 
understand virtues to be character traits 
as well as those dispositions which in-
dividuals develop to promote human 
wellbeing in each community.4  Philos-
ophers and theologians have discussed 
justice as a social good that is related 
to the social contract because the idea 
and practice of justice requires a social 
context which in many cases is a settled 
political community where members 
seek the common good as they work 
out the relationship to one another and 
to the goals and vision of the commu-
nity. 
Aristotle described justice at the 
individual level as that characteristic 
which disposes an individual “to do 
just things, act justly, and wish just 
things”.5 He classifi ed justice under 
two parts, general and the particular, 
which refl ect what he describes as law-
fulness and fairness. General Justice is 
lawfulness and deals with the sum of 
all virtues directed toward the good 
of another person. Particular justice 
refers to the right disposition towards 
good things such as security, money 
and honor in a political community.6 In 
further elaboration of particular justice, 
Aristotle defi ned it in terms of equality 
or fairness with respect to the common 
good that falls under the jurisdiction of 
the political community. He called gen-
eral justice as that which is complete 
because it is based on laws and such 
justice is directed towards another per-
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son. Aristotle claimed: “justice alone of 
the virtues is thought to be the good 
of another.”7 On particular justice, Ar-
istotle differentiated between distribu-
tive and commutative justice, indicat-
ing that distributive justice deals with 
the equal distribution of the common 
goods available to the political com-
munity. Distributive justice works on a 
proportional basis and what he called 
corrective justice promotes fairness 
and equilibrium in society. Commuta-
tive justice involves contracts and legal 
transactions.
Saint Thomas also described justice 
relationally; pointing that justice is the 
virtue that involves relationships be-
tween persons. Particular justice deals 
with one’s relationship to another per-
son and general or legal justice deals 
with communal matters.8 Overall, he 
argued that justice is that virtue which 
promotes fairness, as people see the 
common good. At the particular or 
individual level, compensatory justice 
deals with restitution and recompense. 
At the communal level, justice refers to 
the fair distribution of state resources. 
At both levels, communities strive to 
reach the good for members and seek 
ways of enabling members of the com-
munity to experience social justice. 
Discussions of justice since 1971 has 
focused on the ground-breaking book, 
A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls in 
which he argued: “justice is the ba-
sic structure of society . . . the way in 
which the major social institutions dis-
tribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advan-
tages from social cooperation”.9 Since 
members of a political community 
decide what is just through a process 
that involves public reasoning, debate, 
and deliberation by reasonable par-
ties subjects, Rawls indicates that such 
a process allows participants to focus 
on seven primary goods distributed 
by the “political constitution and the 
principal economic and social arrange-
ments” such as rights, liberties, self-
respect, power, opportunities, income, 
and wealth; goods which form a “thin 
theory of the good” and are crucial for 
well being of individuals and society. 
Principles of allocating these should 
be general, intuitively recognized, 
universal, public, offer preferences to 
confl icting claims, and must be fi nal. 
Determining these, principles start at 
the “original position”, a hypotheti-
cal situation that could serve as a prior 
position before human sociality where 
members of the political community 
acted as free agents, equal, rational, 
self-interested, and ignorant of their 
position, or their preferences and reli-
gious beliefs. This does not mean that 
start with a blank slate because they 
have some general information and 
come with confl icting claims. Rawls ar-
gues that members could develop an 
overlapping consensus in a competing 
liberal context where they share values 
such as democracy and similar visions 
of the political economy. A broad con-
sensus could ensure that “all social 
values—liberty and opportunity, in-
come and wealth and the bases of self-
respect—are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any, 
or all, of these values is to everyone’s 
advantage”.10 Justice for Rawls is un-
deniably part of a liberal social system 
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where the idea of equality is central to 
growth of individuals and members of 
the political community. 
Some scholars who have responded 
to Rawls’ position point out that Rawls 
theory presupposes and privileges west-
ern democratic liberalism and a capital-
ist society, and does not adequately 
address human rights since his theory 
emphasizes the social dimension of jus-
tice. Others argue that Rawls’s theory 
does not consider gender and other 
social inequalities, and the notion that 
there could be some hypothetical situ-
ation devoid of preconceptions where 
the principles of justice could be initi-
ated seems unrealistic.11 Feminist schol-
ars contest the view that justice can be a 
non-contextual dispassionate construc-
tion. Seyla Benhabib has argued that an 
ethic of justice must consider not only 
the concrete history of people, but also 
the “identity and affective-emotional 
constitution” of others in the commu-
nity.12 Kathryn Tanner has pointed out, 
“A just society is not simply a society 
that allows people to go their own way, 
a just society is one that actively cares 
for its members by providing the ‘insti-
tutional conditions that enable people 
to meet their needs and express their 
desires’”.13 Carol Gilligan in her book, 
In a Different Voice, has argued for the 
notion of care as part of understanding 
justice.14 Gilligan has argued women 
develop differently than men because 
their moral thinking is connected to an 
ethics of care. Concern for the good 
of others is not grounded primarily on 
principles and rules but caring as a vir-
tue, which recognizes inter-human con-
nectedness and one’s views of justice 
also depend on human connectivity, 
and care. 
Rawls’ account remains signifi cant 
because he argues: “justice as fairness 
assigns a certain primacy to the social”, 
a view that does not ignore individual 
human rights.15 In other words what 
Rawls describes, as “the profoundly 
social nature of human relationships” 
does not necessarily dismiss individu-
ality.16 The social context provides a 
broad environment for cultivating cer-
tain virtues, and human capacities for 
moral reasoning. In principle, many ex-
pect social structures and institutions to 
promote and be the arbiter of justice 
in different ways. For example, legal 
systems provide mechanisms for adju-
dicating disputes, contracts, and safe-
guards property rights which are con-
nected to social harmony and hence 
the cultivation of justice in society. So-
cial structures also provide a basis for 
thinking of individual and family life. 
These structures are necessary for peo-
ple to think of their rights and responsi-
bilities to others. Sociality offers a basis 
for equality and freedom for members 
to conceptualize justice, fairness, and 
develop the rational capacities for de-
bating and articulating the principles of 
justice.17 There is no doubt that Rawls’ 
veil of ignorance which is integral to 
his notion of the original position is an 
ideal situation where bound by a social 
contract, members of a political com-
munity could arrive at fair principles; 
which given freedom and equality, 
would facilitate the promotion of a just 
society.18 
Even if one were to grant as I do 
that Rawls does not rule out individual-
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ity, the idealism embedded in his theo-
ry remains problematic because social 
groups have discrepancies emerging 
from or grounded on race, gender, 
ethnic origin, and religion. In addition 
to these, problematic issues, in some 
countries around the world, the dif-
fi culty of attaining what Rawls, pro-
posed is constantly being undermined 
by political corruption. To overcome 
this defi ciency Rawls redefi ned the 
original position, arguing: “among the 
essential features of this situation is 
that no one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status, nor 
does anyone know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, his intelligence, strength and the 
like. I shall even assume that the parties 
do not know their conceptions of the 
good or their special psychological pro-
pensities. The principles of justice are 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”19 
This is hardly the case in most societies 
because people have more information 
about the behavior of others and their 
own than the theory allows. 
The proposals of Rawls refl ect argu-
ments that could take place in an open 
society or what some would describe as 
a liberal political community. In the late 
20th century, it became clear that not 
everyone shares the same enthusiasm 
about the virtues of liberalism. For ex-
ample, Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
who himself has a passionate interest in 
virtues and justice has decried the ab-
sence of virtue in the modern world, a 
situation which has made it diffi cult for 
moderns to have a common consensus 
on justice.20 In Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? MacIntyre, has argued that 
the liberal society lacks a coherent ac-
count of justice because the liberal 
society is grounded on the misguided 
Enlightenment project out of which 
has come greater emphasis on individ-
ualism and a doctrine of rights.21 Ma-
cIntyre prefers the articulation of justice 
found in the Thomistic synthesis of the 
Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions 
because in MacIntyre’s view, modern 
approaches to justice are grounded on 
a rights approach and ignores the so-
cial and intellectual traditions that have 
provided humankind with ideas and 
practices of justice.  
Many scholars recognize MacIntyre’s 
passion for the virtues and justice but 
have misgivings about his dismissal of 
liberalism. Hence, one could argue that 
Macintyre assumes that there was al-
ways so kind of a coherent narrative on 
justice, which moderns lack because 
of their commitment to Enlighten-
ment liberalism. However, in fairness 
to MacIntyre, one should point out 
that MacIntyre discusses the different 
positions on justice that existed in the 
Greek polis, giving rise to accounts of 
justice that were grounded in practical 
reasoning to arrive at a consensus on 
justice (dikaiosune), or righteousness.22 
MacIntyre argues:  
The name the Greeks gave to this form 
of activity was 'politics', and the polis 
was the institution whose concern 
was, not with this or that particular 
good, but with human good as such, 
and not with desert or achievement in 
respect of particular practices but with 
desert and achievement as such. The 
constitution of each particular polis 
could therefore be understood as the 
expression of a set of principles about 
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how goods are to be ordered into a 
way of life.23
In rejecting liberalism and dismissing 
the Enlightenment project, MacIntyre 
also fails to appreciate the view that:
A (person) becomes fully human only 
when, instead of remaining subject 
to given needs and desires, he (she) 
shapes his (her) conduct by a law he 
gives himself, and morality is not only 
one form of such self-legislation, but 
also a necessary one for all humanity.24
The political ideals of a liberal state 
such as "liberty, equality, and frater-
nity" have contributed signifi cantly to 
freedoms, human rights, and the search 
for a consensus and it would be a mis-
take to dismiss liberalism because of a 
past lofty tradition.25 Second, even if 
one were to endorse MacIntyre’s argu-
ment, it would be good to remember 
that even in the Aristotelian society, 
which MacIntyre discusses approvingly, 
individual agency was not completely 
lost because people excelled in differ-
ent roles fi rst as individuals and they 
brought those roles together to make 
the community function. Third, one 
would agree with Rawls that the liberal 
tradition, despite its limitations, offers 
a better political space and climate to 
address moral issues, especially justice 
than MacIntyre’s preferred religiously 
infl uenced traditions. 
Amartya Sen has argued that Raw-
ls’s justice as fairness articulates a tran-
scendental perspective, focuses on the 
nature of a just society in contrast to 
a comparative approach to justice and 
fairness which offers alternative ar-
rangements and makes room for the 
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view that some approaches are more or 
less just than others.26 Sen claims that 
the comparative approach is compel-
ling because it invites a consideration 
of social policies that might eliminate 
hunger and illiteracy and contribute 
to justice, but the implementation of 
such policies might violate the tran-
scendental requirements of justice 
that include “equal liberties and dis-
tributional equity.”27 The comparative 
approach might be incomplete but 
thinking from a comparative perspec-
tive could highlight injustice at a time 
when many are destitute in a world of 
prosperity. Such an approach could also 
highlight practices that encourage the 
subjugation of women. Sen empha-
sizes that even where people have a 
specifi ed view of justice, shared beliefs 
could provide partial ranking; making 
“evaluative incompleteness” relative 
to a theory of justice.28 Finally, Sen ar-
gues that institutional requirements of 
the Rawlsian approach would be dif-
fi cult to meet in the context of global 
justice, even with Rawls new starting 
point which emphasizes negotiation 
with different peoples and the giving 
of reasonable help to decent societies 
that may not be just.29 Sen argues that 
what emerges is a silence that inhibits 
public reasoning about justice in the 
manner that Rawls has presented in 
his transcendental perspective. Rawls’s 
view about a common starting point 
ignores the possibility of impartial ar-
bitration, shared beliefs, and prejudices 
that might offer people an opportunity 
to examine issues from the perspective 
of other informed people who do not 
belong to the same society.30
Justice and Public Health at a 
time of HIV and AIDS
One area where justice is a major is-
sue is health care. In many parts of the 
world, there are contentious debates 
about the availability of and acces-
sibility of health care for all the mem-
bers of the political community. The 
debates and contestations on health 
and healthcare tend to focus on public 
health, where the role of the state is 
central in the quest for justice31. Con-
sideration of social justice and fairness 
in the context of public health is crucial 
in the African context and one could 
argue that it does not matter whether 
social justice is seen in the light of what 
ethicist call benefi cence or not. This is 
the case because many now think that 
the state plays a crucial role in promot-
ing and making health care available 
and affordable as a major political re-
sponsibility.32 Many countries provide 
healthcare through government pro-
grams and the state establishes health 
care institutions and sets the rule that 
govern healthcare from the training of 
health care workers to acceptable stan-
dards for drugs. 
The view that health care brings up 
the question of justice has gained trac-
tion in the debate in recent years to the 
extent that health has become a matter 
of rights which can be studied in light 
of the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948. Although that 
declaration was adopted when almost 
all African countries were still colonies, 
nearly all African countries joined the 
United Nations and accepted the dec-
laration on human rights and moved 
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in the late twentieth Century to adopt 
the African Charter of rights as well as 
joined global movements promoting 
women and children’s rights. 
The dominant role the state plays 
in healthcare does not rule out private 
healthcare providers in Africa, especial-
ly, religious communities.  Even in the 
United States, many of the major hospi-
tals are privately owned, have religious 
background or are incorporated busi-
nesses that do not receive any support 
from the State. In Africa, individuals 
and religious communities offer health 
care and run their own facilities. Stud-
ies carried out by scholars from South 
Africa and the United Stated through 
the African Religious Health Assets 
Program (ARHAP) has demonstrated 
that in many parts of Africa, religious 
institutions provide between 30 and 
70 percent of the healthcare needs of 
some countries.33 Globally, healthcare 
is a concern of organizations like the 
World Health Organization that works 
with over 190 nations. Other agencies 
of the United Nations are also involved 
in health care projects. The most well 
known example in the last three de-
cades is the Joint United Nations Pro-
gram to combat HIV AIDS (UNAIDS) 
that was formed to bring together in-
formation and strategies of preventing 
the spread of HIV AIDS and coordinate 
treatment around the world.
There is no uniformed understand-
ing of what good health is, and there 
is no single approach that guarantees 
wellbeing. Instead, the standards, pro-
cedures, and moral perspectives that 
serve as a guide for public health vary 
and are negotiable. What constitutes 
the goals of public health varies, but 
one can generalize from the activities 
that are carried out and indicate that 
public health is the means by which 
states and other private stakeholders 
promote health as a public good. Pub-
lic health is not restricted to medical-
ization, but includes preventive health 
care. Prevention methods and programs 
vary, but they range from the many at-
tempts to eliminate injury, the taking 
of prophylaxis, and vaccination cam-
paigns. Where the state encourages 
good prevention methods, the cost of 
healthcare is greatly reduced and mem-
bers of the community live healthier 
lifestyle. Public health remains an im-
portant part of government responsibil-
ity even though there are many private 
agencies and faith based organizations 
that do health work and are important 
stake holders in the healthcare industry 
of several countries. 
The view that healthcare demands 
justice is also clear from the fact that 
for many people the cost of healthcare 
is prohibitive. In many communities, it 
is the state that has the capacity and 
the resources necessary to meet the de-
mands of public healthcare. Even where 
other organizations are able to provide 
public health care in an effi cient man-
ner, the government still plays an im-
portant regulatory role that could affect 
everything from drug acquisition to the 
type of drugs that are safe to use or set 
the basic standards needed for people 
to qualify as healthcare workers. Stan-
dards established by states and the 
careful use of regulatory systems to su-
pervise health care offer opportunities 
to gauge the state of justice in health-
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care. Many of the debates on health-
care are grounded in the quest for fair-
ness, equal access, and availability of 
quality drugs.34 Most of the debates on 
healthcare focus on justice and several 
scholars in the twentieth century have 
examined justice through an examina-
tion of ethical issues through several 
academic programs such as bioeth-
ics, biomedical ethics, medical ethics, 
medical humanities. Finally, although 
no single approach defi nes or indicates 
the scope of public health, it is also the 
case that the goals and programs car-
ried out in the name of public health 
often refl ect the desire to achieve 
quantity as well as quality of care for 
members of the political community. 
For instance in the 1978 Alma Ata dec-
laration, the World Health Organiza-
tion member states pledged that they 
would achieve health for all by the year 
2000. 
The search for what is fair in public 
health remains a central issue around 
the world. In addition to the cost of 
healthcare, many questions are un-
resolved such as the scope of public 
health itself. Is public health a common 
good? If it is defi ned as a common 
good, should everyone have access or 
if all have access to good medical care 
should the quality of that healthcare 
be the same for everyone in the politi-
cal community? Is it possible then that 
the state can provide equal health care 
to all members of its political commu-
nity? In other words, to what extend 
is healthcare public when it includes 
disparities in terms of access and qual-
ity of care? The provision of basic care 
to all members of the political commu-
nity could go a long way in prevent-
ing future cost or overwhelming the 
healthcare system. That is why some 
have argued that a key way to achieve 
justice in publish health is to distribute 
the resources or burdens of healthcare 
among all the members of the political 
community. 
If justice is an important virtue and 
if achieving it in the political commu-
nity, its success depends on the politi-
cal will of the community. The question 
is; what are the things that impede 
the attainment of justice especially in 
the area of healthcare in the African 
context. The issues in healthcare re-
main lack of accessibility, and lack of 
resources to pay for the medical needs 
of many people. This does not mean 
that Africa is devoid of health institu-
tions; what is implied here is the view 
that healthcare is inadequate and al-
ways there is little quality healthcare for 
the majority of people in the commu-
nity. Often decisions about health care 
are made by government bureaucrats 
who do not often consult with all the 
stakeholders. This is a region where 
long term militarization has depleted 
the economies and the long economic 
decline, which started in the 1970s, has 
not yet ended. Additionally questions 
remain about poor governance, and 
political corruption that has continued 
on a massive scale. The alleged scale of 
corruption has taken money that could 
be used to address health issues out 
of the countries in Africa. If one takes 
a look at the allegations and in some 
cases court papers fi led in Western 
countries to recover what is believed to 
be illegally gotten wealth by politicians 
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and members of their families, it imme-
diately becomes clear that such a diver-
sion of public funds at a time when the 
region is hardest hit with a pandemic 
that is not letting down and ongoing 
struggle with illnesses such as malaria, 
all actions that divert money away from 
important programs like healthcare into 
personal bank accounts of the political 
elites constitutes injustice. 
 The literature on political corruption 
in Africa is full of accusations about cor-
ruption. For example, Newstime Africa, 
reported on October 29, 2011 that the 
United Sates Justice Department had 
fi nally made a move and seized a man-
sion in Malibu California, Gulfstream 
jet, Michael Jackson memorabilia that 
belonged to Teodoro Nguema Obiang 
Mangue, the son of President Teodoro 
Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equato-
rial Guinea.35 The US Justice Depart-
ment also fi led suit in a court in Los 
Angeles, alleging that Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mange who is also Minister of 
Agriculture in his father’s government 
had plundered billions of dollars from 
his country “to buy fl ashy cars, rac-
ing boats, a $38 million Gulfstream jet 
and the $30 million Malibu mansion.” 
Published reports indicate that the son 
of the President who is accused in the 
court papers has reportedly spent mil-
lions of dollars in a lavish playboy life-
style in Europe. Other sources such as 
Global Witness alleged that banks such 
as Wachovia, Bank of America, and UBS 
bank might have done nothing to pre-
vent Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mangue 
to transfer as much as $100 million into 
the United States to pay for these luxury 
items. Such alleged swindling of funds 
comes from a country, which until the 
discovery of oil, depended on foreign 
aid. 
In Europe, the Mail Online, re-
ported that several properties and ex-
pensive cars had been seized from the 
home of an African dictator in Paris. 
“The vehicles, which included two Bu-
gatti Veyrons, a Ferrari 599 GTO and 
a Maserati MC12 are all registered to 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the presi-
dent of Equatorial Guinea”. At one of 
his residence on Avenue Foch, which 
is close to Arc de Triumphe, police also 
seized several luxury cars belonging to 
the Equatorial Guinean President. The 
vehicles “included an Aston Martin V8 
600lm, Rolls-Royce Drophead Coupe, a 
Porsche Carrera GT, and a Ferrari Enzo, 
as well as various Bentleys”. Newstime 
Africa also reported that the Obiang 
Nruema’s are not the only politicians 
in Africa because the current President 
of Gabon, Ali Bongo reportedly has 39 
properties and Denis Sassou-Ngeusso 
of the Republic of Congo is alleged to 
have about 16 properties. 
One of the greatest health challeng-
es in Africa today is the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic, an illness that is individual 
as it is social. How can one talk of jus-
tice in such context? Broadly stated, 
justice in the context of HIV and AIDS 
involves carrying out the obligations of 
human relationships at the individual 
and communal levels.36 People relate 
to others as family, friends, profession-
al colleagues, members of a religious 
community, different kinds of proximal 
relationships, or political confi gurations 
structured by constitutions and institu-
tions. Globalization has created new 
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forms of proximities and extended the 
scope of obligations, opening a cre-
ative space for understanding justice 
which J. B. Schneewind calls “the habit 
of following right reason with respect 
to the rights of others”.37  Therefore, 
minimally, relationships imply a reason-
able recognition of the rights of others 
for wellbeing. These rights include the 
right to be treated as equal partners of 
members of the community who de-
serve liberties, self-respect, opportuni-
ties to participate in the economic and 
political life of the community. Justice 
in this context involves activities that 
would enable members of the politi-
cal community experience the common 
good. Justice then is civic praxis. 
Individuals and members of the po-
litical community need a new dedica-
tion to the idea of a civic praxis rooted 
in human values. MacIntyre argued: 
“The underlying concept of goodness 
(which) has as its focus a conception of 
perfected excellence in a type of activ-
ity specifi c to a particular type of per-
son.  A virtue is a quality of a character 
necessary for the achievement of such 
a good.  And justice is the key virtue 
because both the in the psuche and the 
polis only justice can provide the order 
which enables the other virtues to do 
their work”.38 The polis was not an 
equal space as we understand equality 
today, but what I stress here is the idea 
that members of a community can and 
should cultivate virtues, among which 
justice is central, because it enables the 
other virtues to work.  
In context of HIV/AIDS, a civic agen-
da that could promote justice and fair-
ness implies a number of practices that 
could help clarify a rational perspective 
of justice. First, members of the politi-
cal community ought to understand the 
HIV virus, its spread, replication, and 
the illnesses that result from a weak-
ened immune system. Thirty years after 
the discovery of the virus, religious and 
state leaders still have an obligation to 
educate people about the virus so that 
they can make informed decisions on 
the risks they face. Arriving at what to 
teach calls for constant dialogue by all 
interested parties. Second, understand-
ing the situation calls for each person 
to assume responsibility in creating safe 
environments, where the most vulner-
able people to HIV infections, women 
and children will feel protected and 
take responsibilities for their own sex-
uality. In addition to education on the 
virus, a sustained civic practice requires 
that the state provide resources to 
fi ght HIV and AIDS and depend mostly 
on non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and faith-based organizations 
(FBOs). 
Finally, promoting justice involves 
civic practices that involve advocacy for 
those living with the virus and those 
who are affected by it in different ways; 
either as caregivers, or members of the 
family who have experienced a decline 
in health and living standards because 
they care for someone living with HIV 
and AIDS. Civic activism and advocacy 
could change public and state obliga-
tions on HIV and AIDS. This has hap-
pened in several African countries, 
especially South Africa where mem-
bers of the Gay, Lesbian, bisexual and 
transgender community have shaped 
the debate on HIV and AIDS and ac-
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cess to life saving drugs. Civic activism 
demonstrates that health care is a social 
good for all members of the commu-
nity. In several African countries politi-
cians often have good health care at 
the expense of other members of the 
society. Religious communities and 
leaders could shape the debate on ac-
cess to healthcare as a matter of social 
justice in such contexts. Thomas Ogle-
tree has argued: “When some fare well 
and attain much, it is almost always at 
the expense of others, indeed, not in-
frequently by virtue of the domination 
and exploitation of those others.  Excel-
lence achieved at such a price is morally 
dubious at best. It takes on a morally 
negative cast insofar as it is a function 
of structural forms of social injustice”.39 
Dialogue and advocacy could be 
grounded on concepts and principles 
that have high purchase in the com-
munity. African scholars have appealed 
to Ubuntu as a concept that stresses a 
humane practice of relating, sharing, 
expressing hospitality, and enabling 
others to achieve the good in society. 
Ubuntu also promotes values of love, 
support, and respect for others in so-
ciety. The concept is derived in the 
Southern African contacts from the Isi-
zulu expression, “umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu,” which means “a person is 
a person through persons”. This defi ni-
tion is compelling and one could reject 
articulations of Ubuntu that compare it 
to the Cartesian cogito as several Afri-
can scholars have done.  Additionally, 
ubuntu is not merely a communitarian 
ethic that stresses the community at the 
expense of the individual. The concept 
includes both an individualist ethos 
and well as communitarian principles. 
It highlights individual subjectivity and 
the values shared by members of a com-
munity and as such offers an important 
conceptual tool for establishing inter-
subjectivity and prioritizing the rights of 
persons and communities. Finally, it is 
not correct to argue as Emmanuel C. 
Eze has claimed that ubuntu neglects 
reason, because reason in ubuntu pri-
oritizes the person and community.40 
The World Health Organization 
demonstrates that inequality exists in 
healthcare.41 The claims of justice invite 
a stand against inequality in the politi-
cal community.42  The inequality that 
exists in African countries is measurable 
and there are remedies that could be 
applied to create a more just situation. 
Although religious communities carry a 
large share of healthcare in Africa, the 
nation state can ensure justice by set-
ting healthcare policies that will pro-
mote the common good. Such policies 
should privilege equal access, afford-
ability, and sustainability.  
In addition to civic practices, one 
could approach claims of justice by 
critically examining policies of the state 
in light of primary healthcare which is 
seen by many health experts as a ma-
jor preventative measure and tool that 
could reduce hospital based care. Pri-
mary healthcare does not need expen-
sive healthcare facilities but involves 
interventions which are part of the 
social projects of every state such as 
good sanitation, safe and affordable 
drinking water, good communication 
infrastructure which would allow peo-
ple have access to care in a hospital or 
dispensary should that become neces-
42   
sary, and adequate women’s care that 
includes family planning. To be fair to 
states, some governments in Africa 
have established a hospital or two in 
each district. However, many of those 
hospitals are poorly staffed and have 
no functioning pharmacies. These situ-
ations have compromised health care, 
especially for the poor who do not have 
access to expensive care and drugs. 
Finally, the Christian tradition is in-
volved in healthcare in several African 
countries. Doing good and searching 
for justice in healthcare is a long tradi-
tion in the Christian church. The search 
for justice in the Christian tradition 
is often grounded in the work of the 
Hebrew Bible proposition that human 
beings carry the image of God. This is 
a religious and partisan view that can-
not be imposed on other partners in 
dialogue on justice, but it is important 
because it underscores that value of 
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